Imitation and perspective taking are core features of non-verbal social interactions. We imitate 29 one another to signal a desire to affiliate and consider others' points of view to better 30 understand their perspective. Prior research suggests that a relationship exists between 31 prosocial behaviour and imitation. For example, priming prosocial behaviours has been shown 32 to increase imitative tendencies in automatic imitation tasks. Despite its importance during 33 social interactions, far less is known about how perspective taking might relate to either 34 prosociality or imitation. The current study investigates the relationship between imitation and 35 perspective taking by testing the extent to which these skills are similarly modulated by 36 prosocial priming. Across all experimental groups, a surprising ceiling effect emerged in the 37 perspective taking task (the Director's Task), which prevented the investigation prosocial 38 priming on perspective taking. A comparison of other studies using the Director's Task shows 39 wide variability in accuracy scores across studies and is suggestive of low task reliability. In 40 addition, despite using a high-power design, and contrary to three previous studies, no effect 41 of prosocial prime on imitation was observed. Meta-analysing all studies to date suggests that 42 the effects of prosocial primes on imitation are variable and could be small. The current study, 43 therefore, offers caution when using the Director's Task as a measure of perspective taking 44 with adult populations, as it shows high variability across studies and may suffer from a ceiling 45 effect. In addition, the results question the size and robustness of prosocial priming effects on 46 automatic imitation. More generally, by reporting null results we hope to minimise publication 47 bias and by meta-analysing results as studies emerge and making data freely available, we hope 48 to move towards a more cumulative science of social cognition.
Introduction 50
Social interactions involve a number of cognitive processes and behaviours, including imitation 51 and perspective taking. While both of these social skills have been studied extensively in 52 isolation, the relationship between imitation and perspective taking has received less attention. 53
In addition, although social context modulates imitation [1, 2, 3] much less is known regarding 54 how social context influences perspective taking. The current study investigates the 55 relationship between imitation and perspective taking by testing the extent to which these skills 56 are similarly modulated by prosocial priming. 57
individuals are instructed to respond to a number cue by lifting their index or middle finger. 75
Concurrently, participants either observe a congruent or incongruent finger movement. 76
Reactions times (RT) are longer in the incongruent compared to congruent condition and this 77 difference is thought to signify the cost of inhibiting an imitative response [1, 15] . Here, then, 78 imitation is captured as the time it takes to suppress the urge to copy an observed action and 79 prioritise one's own action. The tendency towards imitation (incongruent RT less congruent 80 RT) will hereafter be referred to as the congruency effect. 81
A handful of studies have explored the effects of prosocial priming on automatic 82 imitation [16, 17, 18] . Priming is thought to operate by subtly triggering a goal that 83 unconsciously guides behaviour [19] . The logic of these studies is that a prosocial prime would 84 activate a goal to affiliate and that this goal would be achieved through increasing the tendency 85 to imitate [16] . Despite using slightly different variants of the automatic imitation task and 86 different experimental designs (see Method section, Table 3 ), each study reported an effect of 87 prosocial priming on automatic imitation; priming increased the congruency effect. More 88 specifically, the prosocial prime had to be self-related to increase imitation (e.g., 'I am 89 prosocial'); when using third person primes (e.g., 'Alex is prosocial') the congruency effect 90 did not differ from controls [16] . These results suggest that a specific type of social prime can 91 modulate automatic imitation; when individuals are personally primed to be prosocial, people 92 find it harder to suppress their imitative tendencies. 93
Like imitation, accurate representation of another's perspective is inherently 94 intertwined with successful social interactions. Perspective taking has been shown to correlate 95 with social competence [20] and successful communication requires both the ability to 96 understand an interaction partner's viewpoint and the ability to separate our own knowledge or 97 beliefs from that point of view [21] . Perspective taking takes many forms, with visual 98 perspective taking referring to situations where one must evaluate what someone else sees or 99 how they see the environment [22] . Typically, individuals adopt an egocentric bias during 100 social interactions, such that their own view is prioritised relative to others' viewpoints [21, 101 23, 24, 25] . 102
Unsurprisingly, such egocentrism can interfere with judgements about others' 103 perspectives [26, 27, 28, 29] . The Director's Task [27, 28] requires participants to follow the 104 instructions of another, the "Director". In this task, a set of shelves, comprising sixteen slots 105 (see Method section Figure 1 ), stand between the Director and a participant. The slots house a 106 variety of familiar items (for example keys and cups), some of which are present in multiples 107 of three and vary in size, and all of which were visible to the participant. However, a number 108 of slots have a backing, such that any objects they contain are occluded from the Director's 109 view. The Director selects objects for the participant to remove from the shelves. On critical 110 trials, the Director is not able to see the object that matches the description according to the 111 participant's view and it is on these trials that participants are required to deduce the item to 112 which the Director is referring (e.g. select the second largest cup if the actual largest cup is not 113 visible to the Director). The task indexes perspective taking by measuring the number of 114 egocentric errors participants make on trials where there is a conflict between their perspective 115 and the Director's perspective. Even when it is made explicitly clear that the Director cannot 116 not see the same objects that the participants can, egocentric errors are still made. Further, there is reason to suggest that automatic imitation and visual perspective taking may, 127 in part, rely on a shared cognitive mechanism that distinguishes self from other. To succeed in 128 automatic imitation tasks, a person must suppress the other's action and promote their own. 129
Conversely, for visual perspective taking, a person must suppress their own knowledge or 130 belief and enhance the other's perspective. Success at both tasks, then, requires a person to be 131 able to quickly and flexibly distinguish between themselves and another. This is known as the 132 'self-other distinction' [see 30]. One study has directly addressed whether automatic imitation 133 and visual perspective taking rely on a partially shared mechanism. Santiesteban and 134 colleagues [31] found that training on a task that required a self-other distinction (imitation 135 inhibition) transferred to a different self-other task; the Director's Task. Even though automatic 136 imitation and visual perspective taking may rely on a common mechanism, no research to date 137 has shown that social context influences automatic imitation and visual perspective taking in a 138 similar manner. 139
The current study, therefore, has three aims. First, drawing from studies exploring the 140 effects of prosocial priming on automatic imitation, we will investigate the effects of prosocial 141 priming on visual perspective taking. Does activating a goal to affiliate enhance one's ability 142 to readily adopt another's visual perspective? Second, we will explore whether visual 143 perspective taking and automatic imitation are correlated following prosocial priming. Does 144 prosocial priming affect them in a similar manner? Third, we will perform a conceptual 145 replication of previous studies, which showed an effect of first person, prosocial priming on 146 automatic imitation [16, 17, 18] . Does activating a goal to affiliate increase automatic imitation 147 in a subsequent RT task? Previous studies exploring this question have been conceptual 148 replications of one another. While each used a different automatic imitation task, they all 149 targeted and found the same main effect, indicating that the specific SRC task is not critical to 150 the success of the prime. In addition, an effect was found irrespective of whether designs were 151 within-subject [16] or between-subjects [17, 18] designs (see Method section, Table 3 ). Here 152 then, a conceptual replication refers to studies using the same priming procedure to target the 153 same effect while deviating on the precise automatic imitation task employed. 154
To test visual perspective taking abilities, we will use the Director's Task [27, 28] . We 155 will include both first person and third person prime conditions, to test whether self-relatedness 156 influences prosocial priming of visual perspective taking in the same way as automatic 157
imitation. Firstly, we predict that prosocially primed groups will achieve higher accuracy on 158
the Director's Task as compared to controls. Secondly, we predict that first person, prosocial 159 priming will produce a positive correlation between visual perspective taking accuracy and 160 larger congruency effects from the automatic imitation task. Finally, in line with previous 161 findings, we expect that first person, prosocial priming will produce a larger congruency effect 162 than both third person and control conditions. Together, these results will test the extent to 163 which social context influences automatic imitation and visual perspective taking in a similar 164 manner and therefore provide insight into the extent to which these core social abilities rely on 165 a shared cognitive mechanism. 166 167
Method 168 169
Participants 170 No previous studies have explored the influence of prosocial priming on visual 180 perspective taking, which means the expected effect size cannot be estimated from such data. 181 Instead, the difference in congruency effects found by previous studies researching prosocial 182 priming and automatic imitation ( Table 3 ) was used to determine our sample size. These prior 183 studies found medium to large effects (Cohen's d of 0.53 -0.75). However, evidence would 184 suggest that published studies overestimate effect sizes [32, 33] . With this in mind, we powered 185 our study to detect effect sizes at the lowest range of those found previously [34] . A sensitivity 186 analysis in G*Power [35] using a one-tailed test, based on a mean difference between two 187 independent groups (PS-1 st and control), with an alpha of .05 and 80% power to detect a 188 medium effect size (Cohen's d=0.5) or larger, returned a sample size of 50 participants per 189 group. Therefore, we aimed to test 150 participants (50 per group) making our sample size 190 much larger than previous studies (Table 3) . 191
192

Procedure and Stimuli 193
Prior to testing, participants were told they were taking part in a study investigating 194 people's accuracy rates and reaction time across three types of tasks. Testing was performed 195 in one session, lasted approximately 45 minutes, and the order of tasks was held constant across 196 participants. Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to a group; first person 197 prosocial (PS-1 ST ), third person prosocial (PS-3 RD ) or control. The order of tasks was kept the 198 same for all participants; first they completed a demographics information sheet and 199 questionnaires, next they completed the priming task, immediately after priming they 200 performed the perspective taking task and finally they completed the automatic imitation task. 201
As our primary task of interest was the perspective taking task, we did not counterbalance the 202
Director's Task with the automatic imitation task as we did want any effects of imitation to 203 confound any effects on perspective taking. Moreover, the Director's task takes only around 204 four minutes to complete (whereas the automatic imitation task takes over double that) meaning 205 any effects of priming should survive the procedure. 206 207 1.
Demographics & Questionnaires 208
Prior to priming, each participant completed a brief demographics information sheet 209 (age, gender, handedness and first language) together with three previously validated 210 questionnaires; the Short Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ-10 Adult) questionnaire [36], a self-211 esteem questionnaire [37] and the interpersonal reactivity index (IRI) [20] . Questionnaire data 212 was collected for another study and is not discussed here. For completeness, the results are 213 provided in Supplementary Table 1 . 214 215 2.
Pro-social Priming Stimuli 216
Prosocial priming was implemented through a scrambled sentences task [38] using 217 sentence stimuli previously used to study automatic imitation [e.g. 16]. Three booklets, each 218 containing 20 sentences, were used and each participant received only one booklet; either PS-219 1 ST , PS-3 rd or the non-social control. Taking around 10-15 minutes, the task consisted of 220 partially completed sentences with a list of words above them, with one word being irrelevant. 221
Participants were instructed to select the correct words to write a grammatically correct 222 sentence. PS-1 st and PS-3 rd sentences contained words such as together, collaborate, 223 affectionate, share and help, which were designed to drive a prosocial attitude towards the self 224 or the other respectively. All PS-1 st sentences started with 'I' whereas PS-3 rd used other people 225 such that it was another person performing the prosocial act. For example, a completed first 226 person, prosocial sentence might read "I always comfort my friends when they are upset" 227 whereas the same sentence in the third person would read "David always comforts his friends 228 when they are upset". To produce a neutral attitude, control sentences were purely factual (e.g., 229
"London is the capital of England"). Director would issue an instruction (e.g. "Move the mouse down") which the participant was 240 required to follow by selecting the named object with the mouse and dragging it to the 241 appropriate slot. Three practice trials were presented prior to the test beginning. Participants 242 were explicitly made aware of the backing on some shelves and told that someone on the other 243 side would not be able to see all of the items. For the main task, there were 48 trials in total; 32 control trials (task involved only one 254 object, which was visible to both participant and director, see Figure 1a ), 8 non-conflict (NC) 255 trials (more than one object of varying size, all visible to both participant and Director) and 8 256 conflict/experimental trials (more than one object of varying size, all visible to the participant 257 but not all visible to the Director, see Figure 1b ). To be correct on an experimental trial, the 258 participant had to identify and move the object to which the Director was referring (see Figure  259 1b for an example). Trials were presented in blocks of three with participants only being given 260 a short amount of time to respond before the next trial would automatically begin. The task 261 was presented by ePrime version 2 and lasted for around four minutes. 262
The smallest dice needs to be ignored as it is occluded from the Director's view
The second smallest dice is the smallest from the Director's perspective
Automatic Imitation Task 264
Next, participants completed the automatic imitation task, based on the task designed 265 by Brass and colleagues [11, 12] . Instructions were provided orally by the experimenter as well 266 as in written form at the beginning of the task. At the start of each trial, participants were 267 instructed to keep their index and middle fingers of their right hand pressed down on keys n 268 and m respectively. Prior to each trial onset, the screen displayed a small fixation cross in the 269 centre of the screen for 500ms. The image of a hand in a neutral position would then appear. 270
Participants were instructed to raise their index finger when the number '1' appeared on screen. 271 When the number '2' appeared, they were to raise their middle finger. Instructions were to 272 respond as fast and as accurately as possible. To be correct on a trial, participants had to raise 273 the finger that matched the number; index for '1', middle for '2'. At the same time as the 274 number appeared, the hand in the background would raise either its index or middle finger. For 275 congruent trials, the stimulus hand would raise the same finger as the participant. For 276 incongruent trials, the stimulus hand would raise a different finger to the participant ( Figure 2 ). 277 278 Figure 2 : An example of a (congruent) trial in the automatic imitation task. The fixation 279
cross is followed by an image of a still hand before the target stimulus (number) is displayed 280 together with a lifted finger (irrelevant stimulus). 281 282
Fixation cross Display: 500 ms
Still hand ISI: 500, 700 or 1,000 ms Data for 32 practice trials was collected prior to priming but not analysed. In the main 283 task, there were 128 experimental trials in total, displayed in a random order, comprising 64 284 congruent trials (32 index and 32 middle) and 64 incongruent trials (32 index and 32 middle). 285
Trials were presented in four blocks of 32 trials with an opportunity for a break being provided 286 between each block. The task took around eight minutes to complete in total. In order to prevent 287 participants from anticipating when the stimulus would appear, inter-stimulus intervals of 500, 288 700 and 1,000 milliseconds were randomly applied to the neutral hand before the next image 289 appeared. The image of the hand and number would remain on screen until the participant lifted 290 their finger or after 2,000ms, whichever came first, before returning to the fixation cross. The 291 task was written in Matlab and presented using Psychophysics Toolbox. 292
293
Following completion of all tasks, participants were debriefed on the nature of the 294
experiment. No participants reported guessing what the experiment was investigating and all 295
were unaware that the scrambled sentences were trying to prime a prosocial attitude. 296 297
Data analysis 298
Visual Perspective Taking task -The Director's task 299
In the version of the director's task that we used, reaction time was not an instructive 300 measure because the start point of the mouse curser was not fixed on every trial (i.e., 301 participants could freely move the mouse during the instruction phase). As such, reaction time 302 did not solely index the length of mental processing time; it also indexed the distance the hand 303 had to travel to select the correct item. Reaction time data were not analysed. The accuracy of 304 performance as a function of trial type and group was analysed. For each trial, participants 305 could be correct, wrong or not answer (omit). Overall accuracy, based on correct responses for 306 all 48 trials, was calculated for each participant. The mean accuracy and SD of each group was 307 calculated. To control for outliers, participants with an average accuracy of less than three SD 308 from their group's mean were removed from their group. This resulted in seven participants 309 being removed in total (PS-1 st : 2; PS-3 rd : 3; and Control: 2) and 146 being taken forward for 310 analysis. For completeness, we also ran the analysis without removing outliers. Independent 311 analysis of variance tests (ANOVAs) were used to explore differences in accuracy across the 312 experimental groups. 313 314
Automatic Imitation Task 315
In the automatic imitation task, reaction time was measured as the time taken from the 316 appearance of the imperative cue ("1" or "2") to when the finger was released. Trials were 317 defined as accurate if the finger lifted matched the target number cue and incorrect if there was 318 a mismatch between finger movement and target number cue. All incorrect responses were 319 removed prior to analysis (<4% congruent trials and <10% of incongruent trials). Trials with a 320 reaction time of less than 250ms or more than 2,000ms were also removed (<.1% of overall 321 trials) as these were suggestive of expectancy errors and lapses in attention, respectively. Data 322 for index and middle finger responses were collapsed. Accuracy and reaction time were Group reaction time and accuracy means were then calculated and participants falling outside 331 of three SD of their group's mean (for either reaction time or accuracy) were removed from 332 further analysis. This resulted in six participants (PS-1 ST : 1; PS-3 RD : 1; and control: 4) being 333 removed from further analysis and 147 being taken forward. ANOVA was used to test for 334 differences in accuracy, reaction times and congruency effects across the experimental groups. 335
To ensure that the removal of outliers did not affect the outcome of our results, analyses were 336 repeated on the complete dataset. 337 338 339
Results 340 341
Visual Perspective Taking Task 342
Accuracy for all trial types across all groups are reported in Table 1 . Performance on 343 the task was high across all groups, with average accuracy exceeding 90% for experimental 344 trials (Figure 3 ). Errors on experimental trials were rare and trials that were omitted (left 345 unanswered) were more common (Figure 4 ). This would suggest that, of the trials completed, 346
there was a ceiling effect present in performance (117 participants scored 100%, 26 scored 347 87.5% and the remaining 10 scored 75% or less). Accuracy for control and experimental trials 348 (conflict between participant's and Director's perspective) were compared between groups. 349
Using group as the between subject's factor, two one-way ANOVAs on trial type revealed no 350 significant differences between groups for accuracy on control F ( Given the overall high accuracy across all groups, which is indicative of a ceiling effect, 366 further analyses of the relationship between visual perspective taking automatic imitation were 367 not performed as they would not be instructive. 368
The Director's task was used because many studies report substantial error rates when 369 using it and, as such, a ceiling effect was not expected. Near perfect scores across all 370 experimental groups in this study prompted a (non-exhaustive) review of studies using the 371 same task with adult participants (Supplementary Table 2 ). The search revealed that the task 372 returns a variety of results ranging from 54-88% accuracy. Worth noting is the fact that the 376
Automatic Imitation task 377
Mean reaction times for congruent and incongruent trials, as well as the congruency 378 effect (CE) are reported in Table 2 . As can be seen, participants were faster and more accurate 379 on congruent trials (Figures 5 and 6) . A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed with 380 congruency (trial type: congruent and incongruent) as the within-subjects factor and group (PS-381 1 st , PS-3 rd and control) as the between-subjects factor. There was a significant main effect of 382 congruency F(1,144)=647.759, p<.001, ηp 2 =.818, with congruent trials being significantly 383 faster than incongruent trials. There was also a significant effect of group F(2,144)=7.882, 384 p=.001, ηp 2 =.099. Mean RTs for each experimental group (collapsed across congruent and 385 incongruent trials) were calculated and compared using t-tests. These analyses showed that the 386 PS-3 rd group was significantly faster than both the PS-1 st t(100)=3.65, p<.001 and control 387 t(94)=3.32, p=.001 groups (see Figure 3 ). There was no mean RT difference between the PS-388 As prior studies analysed the congruency effect [16, 17, 18] we carried out an 405 independent one-way ANOVA on congruency effect as a function of group (Figure 7 ). There 406 was no significant difference between the groups' congruency effects F(2,144)=0.96, p=.387, 407 ηp 2 =.013 . To ensure that the removal of outliers had not changed the results, we ran the same 408 test with all participants (except for one who did not complete the task) included. The result 409 was the same F(2,149)=1.24, p=.291, ηp 2 =.016. In addition, we wanted to ensure that English 410 language proficiency did not impact priming effects. When removing non-native English 411 speakers (N=29), there was still no effect of priming on imitation F(2,121)=1.2, p=.304. 
Meta-Analysis of automatic imitation results: PS-1 st vs Control groups 425
To put our automatic imitation result in context, we performed a meta-analysis. The 426 three previous studies using first person, prosocial priming (scrambled sentences) to investigate 427 the effects on automatic imitation were included in the meta-analysis, along with the current 428 study ( Table 3) . While these studies covered both within- [16] and between- [17, 18] subject 429 designs and employed slightly different methods for testing automatic imitation, they shared 430 sufficient similarity to be directly compared. All four studies used scrambled sentences to 431 prime prosociality and measured imitation via an SRC index of automatic imitation. Therefore, 432 while these studies are not direct replications of each other, they have substantial 433 methodological similarity and all target the same primary effect, such that we consider them 434 conceptual replications of each other. We meta-analysed the difference in congruency effect 435 3rd Control for first person priming compared to control. We were able to obtain raw data from one study 436 [16] . In the absence of raw data for all studies, we used the values available from the published 437 studies to compute standard deviations, standard errors and effect sizes. Cohen's d [44] was 438 calculated as the mean group difference divided by the pooled standard deviation. 439 440 as a measure of precision for these population estimates. The results from these two 452 calculations are reported here using forest plots (Figures 8a and 8b somewhere between a very small and medium effect.
462
The estimated difference in priming between first person and control is 11ms [95% CI 463 4, 19] (Figure 8a ). As can be seen from Figure 8a , two of the four studies in the MA have 464 confidence intervals (CI) that cross over the zero line and the effect sizes range from 4 to 19ms. 465
The standardized effect size is d=0.43 [0.15, 0.7] (figure 8b), and varies across the four studies, 466 with interval estimates touching or crossing zero in three of the studies. These results suggest 467 that the effect is imprecise and it is possible that the true effect size may be close to zero. Prior 468 to running this study, the cumulative effect size based on three prior studies was d=0.64. 469
Adding the current study, which has a much larger sample size than all prior studies, reduces 470 the cumulative effect size by a third to d=0.43 (Figure 8b) . 471 472
Open data 473
To aid future meta-analyses and power estimates, data from the current experiment are 474 available online for all dependent measures (osf.io/bseky). 475 476 477
Discussion 478 479
Due to a ceiling effect using the Director's Task, we were unable to investigate the effects of 480 prosocial priming on visual perspective taking. A comparison of other studies using the 481
Director's Task shows wide variability in accuracy scores. Accordingly, we suggest that the 482 reliability of the measure may be low and future research should test this formally. In addition, 483 and contrary to previous studies and our expectations, we found no effect of prosocial priming 484 on automatic imitation. To better understand this unexpected result, we performed a meta-485 analysis of the effects of prosocial priming on automatic imitation. The result indicates that if 486 a relationship does exist between prosocial priming and automatic imitation, it is likely smaller 487 and more variable than the results of any one previous study would suggest. Therefore, we 488 offer caution when using the Director's Task as a measure of perspective taking and reduce the 489 strength of evidence in favour of social priming modulating automatic imitation. More 490 generally, the current study demonstrates the utility of replicating and meta-analysing main 491 effects in an effort to build a more cumulative science of social cognition. 492 493
Prosocial priming and Visual Perspective Taking 494
We found an unexpected ceiling effect in the Director's Task and, therefore, could not 495 perform our primary analyses of interest. We reviewed published studies that have 496 administered the Director's Task to adults (over 18) and reported their accuracy rates 497 (Supplementary Table 2 ). This brief review found that the task returns a range of results (54-498 88%). As a consequence, and in addition to concerns over the validity of the Director's Task 499 as a measure of visual perspective taking [46, 47, 48, 49] , these findings suggest that the 500 Director's Task could have low reliability, such that task performance appears to vary quite 501 substantially from study to study. As such, we recommend that future studies should formally 502 evaluate the reliability of the measure before using it further. 503
We also note other features of the Director's Task that are worth further consideration 504 in future research. Not all studies using the Director's Task specifically state the number of 505 trials analysed, so it is possible that accuracy scores vary across studies because of 506 methodological differences in the way the task was administered. Further, when interpreting 507 accuracy scores, it is important to note that there are only eight experimental trials; a factor we 508 did not fully consider when designing the study. Scores of 75% and 87.5% may seem 509 substantially different, but in this task, the difference is only one error. This does not bode well 510 for studies such as ours, which aim to improve perspective taking scores through experimental 511 manipulations or training (in this case, through prosocial priming). There simply is not enough 512 "room" to measure any true increase in the skill with adult participants. It could be argued that 513 more trials are needed in the experimental condition, however, given the accuracy rates 514 returned in our data, participants seem to reach ceiling quickly, rendering the data from those 515 extra trials superfluous. Therefore, we offer caution to those interested in visual perspective 516 taking in using the Director's Task, especially if the research question relies on score variability 517 or score manipulation. 518
519
Prosocial priming and Automatic Imitation 520
Previous studies have shown that PS-1 st priming leads to increased congruency effects 521 on automatic imitation tasks [16, 17, 18 ]. Although the current study had the power to detect 522 effects smaller than those previously observed, we did not observe an effect. While we did find 523 a small reaction time difference (6ms) between the PS-1 st priming and control groups in the 524 same direction as previous studies, the difference was not distinguishable from zero. Further, 525 a Bayesian analysis provided three times more support for the null over the experimental 526
hypothesis. 527
Of the four studies included in the meta-analysis, one has a 95% confidence interval 528 that touches the zero line and two actually cross the line (Figure 8b ). This is suggestive of an 529 imprecise estimate of a population effect size, which could be small in size (close to zero) and 530 paints a different picture to the way in which effects were interpreted by each individual study. 531
Overall, the pattern of results is in keeping with suggestions in the literature that published 532 effects are commonly over-estimated [32, 33] and underscores the value of meta-analytic 533 thinking when aiming to synthesise prior findings [45, 50] . It is more than likely that the actual 534 effect of prosocial priming on automatic imitation is smaller than previously reported as the 535 meta-analysis suggests a population effect size of d=0.43. The meta-analysis also illustrates 536 the variability of findings to date, with confidence intervals for the standardised effect size 537 ranging from 0.15 to 0.70. In addition, viewing our null result (d=0.18) within the context of 538 the meta-analysis (d=0.43) suggests that the effect of first person, prosocial priming on 539 automatic imitation is indeed prone to variation. 540 541
Limitations and future directions 542
One potential limitation of the current study is the imitation task used has a spatial 543 compatibility component, which might introduce 'noise' to the data that could interact with the 544 imitative tendencies of the participants [2, 51, 52] . Although possible, it is unlikely to have 545 been the reason behind our null results. Prior studies used the same task and were able to show 546 effects of the same social priming technique on congruency effects [16] . Therefore, while we 547 do not think it can account for the current null results, separating imitative tendencies from 548 spatial compatibility would be a useful future direction for research investigating automatic 549 imitation more generally [51, 53, 54] . 550
One further limitation concerns the sequencing of tasks. To avoid any influence of the 551 imitation task on the Director's Task, we used a fixed order across participants. It is therefore 552 possible that, by administering the Director's Task prior to the automatic imitation task, we 553 unwittingly introduced another prosocial prime that interfered with the effects of the intended 554 prosocial prime. That is to say, taking someone else's perspective may itself serve as a prosocial 555 prime that increases the tendency to imitate. However, if the prosocial prime and the visual 556 perspective taking task both activated a goal to affiliate, we might still expect to observe overall 557 greater imitative tendencies in the first person, prosocial group; the effects on behaviour from 558 both primes might be expected to be additive. This possibility is not supported by the current 559 data due to the fact that the control group returned the same congruency effects as the 560 prosocially primed group. 561
Conversely, if participants did have a goal to act prosocially, the completion of the 562 Director's task could have satisfied this goal and, in essence, 'switched off' the prime. Again, 563 this explanation could account for the lack of group differences in the automatic imitation task 564 as all groups could have been returned to baseline. If this were the case, it would still not 565 encourage thinking of priming as a robust method for increasing prosocial behaviour; as soon 566 as one completes the goal, they return to a neutral position. Alternatively, the visual perspective 567 taking task could have diluted, or even overwritten, any effects the prosocial priming task may 568 have generated, which would account for the lack of group differences. However, with only 569 eight trials among 48 actually requiring the participant to take someone else' perspective, the 570 visual perspective taking task would need to exhibit strong effects to remove those created by 571 the prosocial priming task administered just five minutes previously. Ultimately, a future study 572 is required to determine whether the Director's Task can function as a prosocial prime that 573 modulates imitative tendencies. 574
In summary, the order effect created three possibilities that could in theory account for 575 this study failing to find the same effect on automatic imitation following prosocial priming as 576 that found by other studies. Either 1) the goal from priming was satisfied by completing the 577
Director's task, 2) the Director's task exerts effects strong enough to return all groups to 578 baseline (or equally primed) or 3) the effects of prosocial priming are too weak to survive an 579 intervening task. While no firm conclusions can be drawn at this moment, when considering 580 these possibilities and the highly variable effect highlighted by the meta-analysis, it is prudent 581 to say that the influence of prosocial priming on automatic imitation is unlikely to be robust. 582 583 584
Conclusion 585
Due to an unforeseen ceiling effect in the Director's Task, we could not evaluate whether 586 prosocial priming modulates visual perspective taking and this question remains open for future 587 studies to address. Instead, we suggest that when investigating visual perspective taking using 588 the Director's Task, the possibility that the task has low reliability with adult populations 589 should be given due consideration and formally tested. The current study also questions the 590 robustness of prosocial priming effects on automatic imitation. Indeed, meta-analysing all 591 studies to date suggests that the effects of prosocial primes on imitation are variable and could 592 be small. Finally, by reporting null results we hope to avoid the file drawer problem and 593 inherent bias in the published literature [55, 56] . Also, by meta-analysing results as studies 594 emerge [45, 50] and by making raw data freely available [57], we hope to move towards a more 595 cumulative science of social cognition that future studies can build upon. 596 597 598
